

SECRET

SECRET

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

MINUTES OF THE THIRD MEETING OF THE
USCIB COMMITTEE ON PERSONNEL STANDARDS
AND PRACTICES

MR. JEROME D. FENTON, OSD, CHAIRMAN

MEMBERS PRESENT:

STATE:	Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
OSD:	Mr. Jerome D. Fenton
FBI:	Mr. Bernard A. Wells
CIA:	Colonel Sheffield Edwards
NSA:	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 250px; height: 30px;"></div>
ARMY:	Brigadier General H. O. Paxson
NAVY:	Rear Admiral R. H. Rice
AIR FORCE:	Colonel C. C. Rogers
USCIB:	Major W. R. Culmer

25X1

SECRETARY: LCDR P. J. Karl

ALSO PRESENT:

STATE:	Mr. Otto F. Otepka
OSD:	Colonel Sidney S. Rubenstein
	Mr. Robert E. Drake
CIA:	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 250px; height: 30px;"></div>
ARMY:	Lt. Colonel Richard Leffers
	Major James T. Babbitt
NAVY:	LCDR D. A. Davis
AIR FORCE:	Lt. Colonel Dean C. Gibbons
	Major John H. Remick

25X1A

THIS WAS REFERRED FOR OSD
REVIEW. OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

The second meeting of the USCIB Committee on COMINT Personnel Security Standards and Practices was held in room 3E1060, The Pentagon, on 11 January 1956. Calling the meeting to order at 1005, the Chairman explained that the purpose of the meeting was to consider the report and recommendations of the Ad Hoc Drafting Committee. The members concurred in his proposal to take up the recommendations one by one.

RECOMMENDATION # 1:

The Chairman explained that the purpose of the recommendation was to provide a better focus of responsibility in the determination of "need-to-know".

Major Culmer concurred, with the understanding that final responsibility would rest with the USCIB member in any case.

General Paxson indicated concurrence in the recommendation adding that the recent change in the status of ASA would require some adjustment in this area. He said he felt sure that suitable arrangements could be worked out, however.

There being no further comments, all members agreed to adopt Recommendation # 1 as drafted by the Committee.

-oOo-

RECOMMENDATION # 2:

The Chairman asked for comments.

General Paxson stated that his concurrence would have to be contingent upon the Committee's acceptance of a modification he would propose on Recommendation # 3.

There being no further comments, the Chairman noted that Recommendation # 2 was adopted pending resolution of the question to be raised by the Army member concerning the use of the National Agency Check in granting certain clearances.

-oOo-

RECOMMENDATION # 3:

The Chairman noted that this recommendation dealt with the requirement for personal interviews and personal history statements (PHS), and wondered whether we were perhaps asking for a PHS more frequently than was really necessary.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

The NSA member pointed out the value of the PHS in highlighting information which reveals that a candidate fails initially to meet the clearance criteria.

General Paxson said he felt very strongly that in the case of General and Flag officers it should not be necessary to require a new PHS if a previous one is on file.



25X1

The Air Force member expressed the view that the initial clearance should require a PHS but he doubted that it should be required for subsequent clearances.

The FBI member stated that he could not go along with the requirement for a personal interview.

The Army and Navy members shared this view. They agreed, however, they could accept the requirement in view of the qualifying phrase "if at all feasible".

Mr. Flinn, the State Department member, suggested adding the words "or pertinent" after the words "if at all feasible". He explained that this change would give the security officer the necessary authority to require personal interviews of higher ranking individuals.

There was general concurrence in this change although the Army member expressed the view it tended to weaken the force of the requirement. Along the same line, he said he would propose deleting the word "necessarily" from para. "b" of Recommendation # 3.

Mr. Drake suggested that this same para. "b" could be further amended to provide exemptions from the PHS and the personal interview, in the case of General or Flag officers.

With regard to the requirement for a personal interview, Admiral Rice stated that budgetary considerations and geographical spread would militate against effective compliance.

The Army member agreed with the Navy member that the commanding officer would doubtless have to conduct the interview when trained security or CIC personnel were not available in a given area.

The members agreed to the deletion of "necessarily" as well as to the substitution of the word "requirements" for the words "complete formal investigation" in para. b of Recommendation # 3. In the same

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

paragraph, the State member suggested inserting "officers of the Foreign Service of Ministerial rank or higher", after the words "Armed Forces." All members concurred.

Moving on to paragraph "c", General Paxson pointed out that a clause would have to be added excepting the personnel described in para. "b" above. All members agreed to this as well as to the Chairman's proposal to make a parenthetical clause out of the desideratum of having trained security officers or CIC personnel conduct the personal interviews.

All members agreed to adopt Recommendation # 3 as amended. The revised version is as follows:

a. Change para. 3.b. to read:

"b. To permit evaluation on the basis of the foregoing requirements each person, except as provided in para. c below, to be cleared for COMINT shall, prior to clearance, be required to furnish a signed Personal History Statement or other documentation containing information essentially similar to that called for in the sample form attached hereto as Annex 1; be subjected to a personal interview, to be conducted, if at all feasible or pertinent, by trained security or counter-intelligence personnel, and be subjected to a thorough investigation which shall include at least the following:"

b. Change the first sentence of para. 3.c. to read:

"c. General and Flag officers of the Armed Forces, officers of the Foreign Service of Ministerial rank or higher, and civil officials appointed by the President and approved by the Senate need not be subjected to the requirements as outlined above in paragraph 3.b."

c. Change para. 3.e. to read:

"e. When there is compelling need to clear a person for COMINT prior to completion of the full prescribed investigation, and the responsible authority has determined upon such advance clearance (paragraph 4c hereinafter), such investigative checks as are immediately possible shall be made at once, and shall include, except for personnel described in para. c above, a personal interview (to be conducted, if at all feasible, by trained security or counterintelligence personnel). The full prescribed investigation and final evaluation shall be completed at the earliest practicable moment. Interim clearances granted on this basis must be held to a minimum."

-000-

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

RECOMMENDATION # 4:

The Chairman observed that this recommendation suggests a corps of senior experienced investigators to handle investigations of COMINT personnel.

The members representing the Armed Forces indicated that this was already being done in some measure in the Services. However, General Paxson suggested deleting the word "senior" between "experienced" and "investigators", pointing out that it could easily be misinterpreted. All members agreed. General Paxson also suggested the word "insure" in place of "institute". All members agreed.

Mr. Flinn proposed substituting the words "priority handling" for "expeditious handling", adding his belief that this change more accurately reflected our goal. All members agreed.

The Chairman noted that all members agreed to adopt Recommendation # 4 as amended at the meeting. The revised version follows:

It is therefore recommended that USCIB request each member department and agency to insure, with the investigative facility available to it, procedures whereby investigations of COMINT personnel are flagged for priority handling by experienced investigators.

-oOo-

RECOMMENDATION # 5:

It was the consensus of those present that the aim of this recommendation was to promote increased collaboration among the investigative services.

General Paxson suggested the words "complete by 1 December 1956" be substituted for "initiate as soon as possible". All members agreed.

The Chairman noted that Recommendation # 5 was adopted as amended.

The new version follows:

It is further recommended that the USCIB member departments and agencies complete by 1 December 1956 a study to determine the feasibility of increased collaboration among their respective investigative facilities in order to promote speed, economy and thoroughness in the conduct of COMINT personnel investigations.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

RECOMMENDATION # 6:

All members agreed to the following amended version of this recommendation:

a. Change para. 3.b.(7) to read:

"(7) Interviews with neighbors and working associates and/or other persons who might be able to furnish information on the subject individual's character, discretion and loyalty."

b. Add a para. 3.b.(8):

"(8) Interviews with at least two additional persons developed through the preceding investigative steps who can furnish information on the subject individual's character, discretion and loyalty."

-oOo-

RECOMMENDATION # 7:

All members agreed to adopt the drafting committee's version of Recommendation # 7 without further amendment.

-oOo-

RECOMMENDATION # 8:

At the conclusion of the discussion on this item, it was agreed to ask the drafting committee to rewrite Recommendation # 8 along the lines of thought expressed by the members. For example, all agreed that the person to be cleared for COMINT must be a native-born U. S. Citizen, and members of his immediate family must be U. S. citizens. All agreed that a definition of "immediate family" was required but agreed ultimately on a proposal that the definition end with the word "children", viz: "For purposes of this directive, 'immediate family' is defined as including spouse, parents, brothers, sisters, and children".

In rewriting the remainder of this recommendation dealing with loyalty to the U. S. and allegiance to a foreign country, the members believed that the drafting committee should consider the following points: (a) control and influence a relative may exert over an individual to be cleared rather than mere "family tree" relationship; (b) legal implications of the term "resident of a foreign country"; (c) the hostage risk in Soviet or Satellite countries; and (d) more positive wording of this section.

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

The committee took action as indicated below on the remaining recommendations of the drafting committee:

- RECOMMENDATION # 9: Approved.
- RECOMMENDATION # 10: Approved.
- RECOMMENDATION # 11: Approved.
- RECOMMENDATION # 12: Approved.
- RECOMMENDATION # 13: Approved.
- RECOMMENDATION # 14: Approved.
- RECOMMENDATION # 15: Approved..
- RECOMMENDATION # 16: Disapproved.
- RECOMMENDATION # 17:

Approved in principle, but returned to drafting committee for revision with a view to limiting its scope to "sensitive" individuals.

- RECOMMENDATION # 18: Approved.
- RECOMMENDATION # 19:

Approved in principle, but returned to drafting committee for revision in order to make a clear distinction between less "sensitive" and more "sensitive" personnel in establishing criteria for re-investigations

- RECOMMENDATION # 20: Approved.
- RECOMMENDATION # 21: Approved.
- RECOMMENDATION # 22: Approved.
- RECOMMENDATION # 23: Approved. (See note below)
- RECOMMENDATION # 24: Approved. (See note below)
- RECOMMENDATION # 25: Approved. (See note below)

(Note: The members agreed that Recommendations # 23, 24, and 25 should appear as Recommendations # 1, 2, and 3 of the final report to USCIB.)

Referring to the instruction which this committee received from USCIB, Admiral Rice noted that the drafting committee's report made no mention of

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

the feasibility of establishing different levels of clearance for access to the different categories of COMINT. He recommended, therefore, that the final report to USCIB state that this concept was found to be not feasible.

All members agreed and the Chairman indicated that the drafting committee should prepare an appropriate statement along this line for inclusion in the final report.

The State Department member recommended that a yearly review be made of the implementation of USCIB Security Directives by the member departments and agencies. It was thought that the USCIB Security Committee could be charged with this responsibility. The members agreed and the Chairman asked the drafting committee to include consideration of this item in their next report.

It was agreed that a target date of 1 February 1956 should be established for consideration of the final report of the drafting committee with the re-draft to be circulated a week in advance if possible.

There being no further business, the meeting adjourned at 1330 hours.

SECRET